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IMPACT FEES: ET TU, ILLINOIS?
WENDY U. LARSEN* AND MICHELLE J. ZIMET**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Local governments became more active in the development and
operation of capital facilities in the early 1900's. These governments
began to assume the responsibility of providing capital facilities,
which had been largely the province of the private sector. In part,
the notion of public provision of infrastructure facilities was
grounded in the belief that communities could collectively afford to
provide safe and healthful infrastructures, and that everyone could
share in the benefits of public convenience.'
This collective perspective on the provision and financing of
"public" facilities was reinforced in the 1950's, 60's and 70's as federal road and water pollution projects provided billions of dollars of
local capital facilities. Because general federal and state revenues financed needed infrastructure, however, the public and its elected
officials did not appreciate the direct linkage between new growth
and development and the cost of infrastructure needs. Many individuals believed then, and still do today, that municipalities have an
"obligation" to provide water, sewer and roads in support of growth
and development, no matter what the financial implications of that
obligation.2
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DePaul University.

** Associate, Siemon, Larsen & Purdy, Chicago, Illinois. B.A., University of
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1. See generally Exactions:A Controversial New Source For Municipal Funds,
50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (R. Babcock ed. 1987).
2. Indeed, the courts accepted this perspective that local government is responsible for paying for needed additional public facilities in the infamous trial court deci-

sion in Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Calif.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934

(1976). In the late 1970's, many state courts similarly concluded that municipalities
could not limit development simply because of the inadequacy of public facilities,
though in most cases the courts found that adequate facilities could be made available and that the community's action was not justified. See, e.g., Charles v. Diamond,
447 A.D.2d 426, 366 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1975) (court held that where the village had been
subject to a long standing consent order to modify its public sewage system to meet
minimum state standards and had not done so, a property owner would be permitted
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The reality was, and is, that there are no "free lunches." Eventually, federal budget problems, deficit control measures, and the financial strain of supporting the capital facility needs of local government took their toll on federal willingness to devote federal
revenues to local programs. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, as
local government became responsible for funding its own needed improvements, it discovered the difficulty of accounting for the lagtime in the need for new growth and development and its ability to
support that growth with tax revenues.3
Years of federal and state subsidies led the general public and
the development community to believe that local government paid
for capital facilities, i.e., "someone else." The public and development community's resistance to property tax increases to finance
the cost of needed improvements has resulted in both a lack of
funding for needed facilities, and in the inability of local governments to build facilities in a timely fashion. Inevitably, public opinion in cities across the country concluded that because new growth
and development creates the demand for new facilities, there should
be no additional growth unless facilities are available to support
such growth. Moreover, it is believed that new growth and development should not be permitted unless the new development pays for
the needed facilities.4
As a result of these developments, many governments are now
adopting alternative funding sources such as impact fees and other
developer "fair share" programs, the so-called "innovative capital
facilities financing devices," to address their financial situations.'
to bring a taking claim against the village). In those cases where limits on growth
were based on demonstrable natural or built environmental constraints, the programs
were generally upheld. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30
N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291 (upholding constitutionality of subdivision development timing ordinance), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
3. Local government has traditionally relied on the ad valorem tax as its principal source of general revenue. Ad valorem taxes, however, generally create a lag between costs and revenues because infrastructure is needed many years before the additional value of property makes up for new capital facilities. Some states have
reacted to the escalated cost of these taxes by enacting measures designed to cut
property taxes. See, e.g., California's Proposition 13, CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (West
1978); Massachusett's Proposition 2-1/2, MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 59, § 21C (West
Supp. 1986).
4. Many communities have recognized that the timing and location of new public facilities can be an effective growth management technique in that it tends to
regulate, or control, development. See AMERICAN SocIETYv OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, Local CapitalImprovements and Development Management Synthesis 19 (Wash. D.C.,
Office of Policy Development and Research, July, 1977); see also Harwell, Impacts on
Community Growth and Form, in V MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH 183 (F.
Schnidman & J. Silverman ed. 1980).
5. The concept of innovative capital facilities financing devices includes: impact
fees; special assessments; developer's agreements; user fees; connection fees; and tolls.
These devices allocate the cost of capital improvements to those who need and benefit from the facilities-developers and their customers. See Keyes, Innovative Fi-
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What was originally a method of guaranteeing installation of physical improvements needed on-site to meet the needs created by new
development has evolved into a system for accumulating a "municipal kitty" with which to construct capital facilities in the future.'
Mandatory dedication of subdivision roads, utility easements
and park lands as a condition of subdivision approval was probably
the earliest form of exaction that courts accepted as a reasonable
means of making development responsible for serving itself.7 The
dedication of facilities as a condition of development has subsequently evolved into a fine art, as developers negotiate with local
governments by offering various amenities or improvements.' If the
1950's, 60's and 70's were the decades of "free lunches," as local governments looked to state and federal grants for capital facility financing, then the 80's have become the decade of the "impact fee." 9
Numerous communities have ignored the rhetoric that impact fees
will destroy the local economy, and have adopted impact fees and
other off-site exactions as conditions of development approval.10
nancing for Highway Improvements in Real Estate Development, INST. TRANSP. ENG.
J., March 1986, at 23. See generally DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS APA PRESS (J. Frank &
R. Rhodes ed. 1987); CAPITAL FINANCING STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT ASS'N (J. Matzer, Jr. ed. 1983); J. NICHOLAS, CHANGING
STRUCTURE OF INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE (1985); D. Porter & R. Peiser, FinancingInfrastructure to Support Community Growth, URBAN LAND INSTITUTE (1984).
6. Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit
Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 5, 28 (R. Babcock ed. 1987). Critics state that the
concept of exaction fees has evolved into a system by which local governments often
exact payments from developers that are not directly attributable to the new development. Id. at 29; see also Collis v. City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N.W.2d 19
(1976) (Minnesota Supreme Court referred to exaction fees as "grand theft").
7. See generally Ferguson & Rasnic, Judicial Limitations of Mandatory Subdivision Dedications, 13 REAL ESTATE L.J. 250 (1985); Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents
Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964); Lester, Subdivision Exactions in Washington: The Controversy Over Imposing Fees on Developers, 59 WASH.
L. REV. 289 (1984).
8. See Porter, Exactions, Extractions, and Extortions, 44 URB.LAND 36 (1985).
9. Surveys of local governments that the National Association of Homebuilders
and the Homer Hoyt Institute at Florida State University indicate that the use of
innovative financing devices are widespread throughout the country, even in those
states that are not known as "exotic" or growth states. See Bauman & Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American Practices, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1987); J. Frank, E. Lines & P. Downing, Community Experience
with Sewer Impact Fees: A National Study. (Policy Sciences Program, Florida State
University, 1985).
10. Impact fees have principally evolved in California and Florida, termed the
"megagrowth" states, where staggering growth has sorely pressed the capacity of local
government to provide adequate public facilities. As a result, these are the states that
have the most extensive practical and legal experience with the concept of impact
fees and the states to which other states should look in evaluating the legal and practical implications of a program of innovative capital facilities financing devices. This
is not to say that other states have not jumped on the impact fee bandwagon. Indeed,
even non-growth states have faced the issue of funding public facilities through the
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Illinois, known in the land use literature as a "developer
state,"" has been more conservative about exacting fees or land
from developers than have some of the high growth states. There
have been some notable exceptions, however, in the Chicago metropolitan area. Many Illinois municipalities, presently searching for alternative sources of capital funding, view impact fees as a viable alternative to increasing property taxes." Furthermore, a recent
amendment to the Illinois Highway Code specifically empowers certain counties to adopt an impact fee program to assist in the funding of state and county roads.13 Both DuPage County and Lake
County have commenced studies pursuant to this new legislation.",
It is clear, therefore, that impact fees have "come to Illinois." This
article discusses the existing legal framework for impact fees and addresses the administrative issues relating to impact fees. The article
projects the legal issues that are likely to be raised as fee programs
mature in Illinois 5 and concludes that while local governments have
the authority to adopt impact fee programs, these local governments
will have to demonstrate the burden any new development imposes,
and also ensure that new developments are not paying more than
use of impact fees, and their courts have expressly confirmed the legality of the concept. See, e.g., Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (court upheld in
lieu fee for flood control, park, and recreational purposes); see also Survey of Current
Practice for Identifying and Mitigating Traffic Impacts, INST. TRANSP. ENG. J.,May
1987, at 38, 40. A survey by a committee of the Colorado/Wyoming Section of the
Institute of Transportation Engineers reveals that 27% of the responding jurisdictions have a structure for exacting traffic impact fees as a funding source. Id.

11.

1 N.

WILLIAMs, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW

§ 6.17 (1974).

12. The transportation engineering firm of Barton-Aschman, Assoc., Inc., conducted a recent study in DuPage County, Illinois. The study revealed that a number
of communities are using impact fees at the time of annexation, and that many municipalities are currently evaluating the prospect of collecting fees to fund capital
improvements. The City of Naperville, Illinois, for example, has grown faster in the
past 10 years than most communities of its size in the United States, and is in the
process of developing an impact fee ordinance to fund off-site road improvements.
Barton-Aschman Assoc., Inc., DuPage County Impact Fee Study, Feb. 1988, at 27.
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, 5-608 (1987) (amended September 17, 1987, enacted as P.A. 85-464, effective January 1, 1988). This new amendment to the Illinois
Highway Code provides that county boards of any county with a population between
400 thousand and 1 million persons may collect transportation impact fees. At the
present time, DuPage and Lake Counties qualify under this legislation. See infra
notes 42-45 for a discussion of the new amendment to the Illinois Highway Code.
14. See, e.g., DuPage County Impact Fee Study, supra note 12.
15. In the land use arena, most "new" techniques eventually find their way to
the court system, but the experience elsewhere has been that after a few initial
skirmishes, impact fees have been designed in accordance with methodological principles accepted by the early decisions; accordingly, impact fee programs have had few
subsequent challenges. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text for a discussion
of legal challenges to impact fees in Florida. The authors believe that the development community for the most part will recognize the logic of well-conceived impact
fees and other systems designed to ensure that the capital facilities needed by new
growth and development are in place to serve that development by the time the development is completed.
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their "fair share" of the costs of such improvements.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

There are two significant issues that control the use of impact
fees or exactions. The first is whether the local government has the
authority to impose such a fee as a condition of development approval. Local governments are creatures of the state and operate
within the spectrum of the state's police power as it is delegated to
them by statute or state constitution."
The second issue is whether the fee has been constitutionally
employed.1 7 From a due process of law perspective, the issue, ex16. Depending on the nature of the delegation involved, it may be that a local
government is not authorized to attach exactions as conditions for a development
permit. For example, a Virginia statute expressly prohibits such exactions. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.1-491.2 (1980 & Supp. 1986). Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme
Court recently concluded that the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law did not authorize local governments to raise needed revenues for capital facilities as a part of
local land use controls. New Jersey Builders Ass'n & Mill Race, Ltd. v. Mayor &
Township Comm. of Bernards Township, 108 N.J. 223, 528 A.2d 555 (1987).
17. While any regulation is subject to the constraints of the Illinois and United
States Constitutions, substantive and procedural due process and the equal protection clauses are the principle applicable "constraints." While procedural due process
may be a relevant factor in some instances, this article will focus upon substantive
due process and equal protection considerations.
Substantive due process requires that governmental powers affecting private
rights and interests be exercised in a fundamentally fair fashion. The concept of fundamental fairness has shaped modern land use controls both substantively and procedurally. In order for an ordinance to meet the standards of substantive due process, it
must bear a "substantial relationship" to the public purpose, i.e., the public health,
safety and welfare sought to be achieved. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926) (Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of zoning as an
appropriate exercise of the police power, provided the zoning was substantially related to the public health, safety and welfare). Substantive due process is a standard
that has provided the substantive backbone of land use controls for over 50 years,
and ensures that the police power is sufficiently broad to protect the public welfare
from more than just "offensive and noxious" activities. See Siemon, Who Bears The
Cost? 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 118-21 (1987). For additional discussion of
substantive due process, see infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
The thrust of an equal protection challenge to a land use regulation is that a
government regulation effectuated "invidious discrimination" against a class of individuals. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977) (exclusionary zoning invalidated); Clayton v. Village of Oak Park, 117
Ill. App. 3d 560, 453 N.E.2d 937 (1983) (upheld equity assurance program for single
family residents). A municipal regulation will be constitutional under the equal protection clause only so long as it is supported by a "rational basis." See, e.g., City of
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
Developers have often argued unsuccessfully that mandatory impact fees illegally
discriminate against new development. See, e.g., Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 68 Ill.
2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977) (failure to apply exaction requirement to developers of
subdivisions within school district, but outside municipality's jurisdiction, was not
violation of equal protection). Equal protection claims have usually been rejected in
the past because an impact fee program requires that new development only pay its
"fair share" of the cost of capital improvements, and because all new development is
treated equally under a formula or schedule of fees. See Heyman & Gilhool, The
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pressed in its simplest form, is whether the fee is "reasonable." As
subdivision and development regulations proliferated, the courts developed a variety of standards to ensure that, to varying degrees, a
"substantial relationship" exists between the regulatory requirements and the public purposes for which they were imposed. The
three standards that state courts have recently employed in determining the constitutionality of exactions ordinances examine
whether an exaction is either: (1) specifically and uniquely attributable; (2) bears a reasonable relationship; or (3) has a rational nexus
with the impact of the new development."8
A. Authority to Impose Impact Fees
1. Home Rule Municipalities
The authority of local government to regulate the use of land is
derived from the state's police power to regulate the public health,
safety, morals and welfare."9 This power was traditionally delegated
to local governments through specific enabling acts that authorized
particular regulatory programs subject to specific requirements. In
recent years, most states, in recognition of the sophistication of local
government and the complexity of the issues local authorities faced,
have granted "home rule" powers to local governments."
The Illinois Constitution grants home rule units the authority
to exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its
government and affairs, including, but not limited to, the power to
regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and
welfare, i.e., the police power, to license, to tax, and to incur debt.2
This provision of the constitution establishes a presumption in favor
of municipal home rule because any statute enacted after the adoption of the 1970 Constitution cannot limit home rule powers unless
it falls within one of the preemption provisions of Article VII, secConstitutionalityof Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L. 1119, 1134 (1963); see also infra
notes 86-89 for a discussion of equal protection and exemptions.
18. See, e.g., Bell, California Opens the Door For Municipalities to Obtain
Greater Revenue from Subdivision Exactions, 22 REAL PROPERTY & PROB. TRUST J.
345, 346 (1987) (discussion of the three major tests that have developed to discern
how attenuated an exaction may be).
19. 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING & PLANNING, § 2.01(3) (1987). Municipalities have no police power per se. A municipality, however, may exercise police
power that the state has specifically or impliedly delegated to it. Id; see, e.g., Park
Ridge Fuel & Material Co. v. City of Park Ridge, 335 Ill. 509, 167 N.E. 119 (1929).
20. In Illinois, any county that has a chief executive officer elected by the electors of the county, and any municipality that has a population of more than 25,000
people are home rule units. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (1970). Other municipalities
may elect to become home rule units by referendum. Id.
21. Id.
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tion 6(g), or section 6(h). 2
While an argument might be made that because the legislature
has "spoken" on the topic of road impact fees through the amendment to the Highway Code, the authority of home rule units to similarly legislate has been "preempted," Illinois courts have held that
any preemption of home rule powers by the General Assembly must
be explicitly set forth in the statute.2 3 In the absence of such express
preemption, Article VII, section 6(i) states that home rule units may
exercise power "concurrently" with the State, to the extent that the
General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent
exercise or specifically declare the State's exercise to be exclusive.24
22. ILL. CONST. art. VII, §§ 6(g)(h) (1970). The Illinois courts have consistently
held that the autonomy of home rule governments, as granted by the 1970 Constitution, is limited only by the Constitution itself. In City of Urbana v. Houser, 67 Ill. 2d
268, 270, 367 N.E.2d 692, 694 (1977) (citing Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d
161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972)), the Illinois Supreme Court asserted that "[home] rule
units . . . have the same powers as the sovereign except where such units are limited
by the General Assembly . . . . Now, home rule units, under the 1970 Constitution,
have an autonomy and independence limited only by restrictions imposed by the
Constitution or authorized by it."
The court's assertion echoed the earlier statement of the Illinois Supreme Court
in Kanellos, where the court stated:
Under the home rule provisions of the 1970 Constitution . . . the power of the
General Assembly to limit the actions of home rule units has been circumscribed and home rule units have been constitutionally delegated greater autonomy in the determination of their governmental affairs. To accomplish this
independence the constitution conferred substantial powers upon home rule
units subject only to those restrictions imposed or authorized therein.
Kanellos, 53 Ill. 2d at 166, 290 N.E.2d at 243.
Lower Illinois courts have followed the Houser and Kanellos decisions. See City
of Carbondale v. Eckert, 76 Ill. App. 3d 881, 889, 395 N.E.2d 607, 612 (1979) ("home
rule units have had an autonomy and independence limited only by the restriction
imposed or authorized by the constitution"); Carlson v. Briceland, 61111. App. 3d 247,
250, 377 N.E.2d 1138, 1140 (1978) (in adopting home rule, framers of the new constitution intended to reverse the presumption against local authorities and establish a
new presumption in favor of municipal and county).
23. See, e.g., Leck v. Michaelson, 129 Ill. App. 3d 593, 604 n.8, 472 N.E.2d 1166,
1174 n.8 (1984). In Leck, the court noted that the General Assembly's enactment of
election statutes did not result in an implied preemption of home rule authority over
local election laws since the Constitution requires that preemption of home rule powers must be explicit. Id; see also City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 IlI. 2d 101, 11617, 421 N.E.2d 196, 203 (1981) (Illinois Supreme Court upheld an ordinance regarding
landlord-tenant relations in a home rule municipality). The court found that the Illinois Constitution had not limited a home rule unit's authority in this area. Id.; see
also Rozner v. Korshak, 55 Ill. 2d 430, 433, 303 N.E.2d 389, 390-91 (1973) (Illinois
Supreme Court held that the constitution did not limit the power of home rule governments to impose a wheel tax).
24. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. City of Chicago, 125 Ill. App. 3d 95, 465
N.E.2d 603, 605 (1984). In Peoples Gas, the court held that a city ordinance which
prohibited a utility company from terminating gas service to residential consumers
during the winter months was not an exercise of local government power that primarily pertained to the city's government and affairs, and was therefore beyond the scope
of home rule powers envisioned by the state constitution. Id. at 97, 465 N.E.2d at
604-05. The court further held that the city did not enjoy concurrent power to regulate in this area because longstanding state-wide interest in the field of public utility
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If the statute is silent, then there is an implied presumption that
home rule powers can be exercised."'
If a home rule municipality were to enact an impact fee ordinance based on its police power authority granted under Article VII,
paragraph 6 of the Illinois Constitution, the ordinance would not
conflict, nor be preempted by, the State's general laws because Illinois does not have any statute other than the Highway Code amendment that either prohibits or authorizes the use of impact fees as a
means of financing public improvements. Therefore, home rule powers should be sufficient to enable municipalities to enact impact fee
ordinances, absent specific enabling legislation."6
2.

Non-Home Rule Municipalities

Non-home rule municipalities only have powers that are either
expressly granted to them by law, enumerated in Illinois Constitution Article VII, section 7, or, at a minimum implied by statute. 7
Under this limitation, known as Dillon's Rule, non-home rule units
are strictly limited to those municipal powers that are expressly or
impliedly authorized or necessarily incidental to the objectives for
which the municipal corporation was created. Dillon's Rule provides
that non-home rule municipal powers can only be exercised for
"purely local affairs and generally only within the borders of a
municipality."2 8
While home rule authority is most likely sufficient to provide
home rule municipalities with the authority to adopt an impact fee
program, non-home rule units may have to rely on other statutory
regulation precluded consideration of utility regulations as a matter pertaining to local government and affairs as contemplated by the home rule provisions of the state
constitution. Id. at 100-01, 465 N.E.2d at 607-08.
25. Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 II. 2d 523, 528, 343 N.E.2d 919, 923
(1976). In Stryker, several police officers brought an action against the village seeking
a declaratory judgment that certain ordinances were invalid because they conflicted
with a preexisting state statute. Id. at 524, 343 N.E.2d at 920. The Illinois Supreme
Court held that when a statute is silent regarding its applicability to home rule units,
home rule units are empowered to enact ordinances that conflict with state statutes.
Id. at 528-29, 343 N.E.2d at 922-23. Only specific state constitutional limitations can
restrict the power of home rule units to enact ordinances. Id.
26. Because home rule units have broad powers to enact ordinances, and the
Illinois Constitution is silent regarding impact fees, home rule units should be authorized to enact impact fee ordinances. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text for
a discussion of home rule powers and constitutional limitations.
27. See 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448 (5th ed. 1911); see also Village
of Northbrook v. Village of Glenview, 88 Ill. App. 3d 288, 294, 410 N.E.2d 431, 435
(1980) (court cited the proposition that a municipal corporation may derive powers
by implication from the state enabling statute, but chose not to determine if the
power to enter into an agreement to limit its power to rezone unincorporated land
upon annexation was among such powers).
28. Hall & Wallack, Intergovernmental Cooperation and the Transfer of Powers, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 778.
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authority or police power case law to support an impact fee ordinance. To date, the only explicit statutory provision in Illinois that
grants local governments the authority to impose impact fees to mitigate the fiscal impact of growth is the new amendment to the Illinois Highway Code.2 9 Non-home rule municipalities that wish to
fund street or highway improvements through impact fee type programs must look for implied statutory authority and supporting case
law interpretation of the Illinois Municipal Code. 30 Nationwide, the
pattern has been the adoption of impact fee programs without specific statutory authority. This pattern is being repeated in Illinois."'
For example, a number of communities have already implemented
"impact fee type" fee programs, while others charge per acre annexation fees, which are purportedly designed to offset the impact of
newly annexed lands on village services.32
3. ExtraterritorialAuthorization
The issue of whether impact fees or other exactions can be imposed extraterritorially concerns Illinois municipalities because the
Illinois courts have not addressed a challenge to a true impact fee.
Furthermore, concern arises because the Illinois Supreme Court has
held that the framers of the Constitution intended that home rule
units exercise only those extraterritorial powers that the legislature 3
grants, despite the broad grant of authority by the Illinois Constitution to home rule units of government.3 ' In other words, home rule
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, 5-608 (amended Sept. 17, 1987, enacted as P.A. 85464, effective Jan. 1, 1988). See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of Illinois Highway Code amendment.
30. There is specific statutory authority in the Illinois Municipal Code to pay
for "local improvements." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, art. IX. In addition, Article IX empowers municipal plan commissions and planning departments to prepare and recommend to the corporate authorities a comprehensive plan for the present and future
development or redevelopment of a municipality. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,
11-12-5
(1985 & Supp. 1987). These plans may include reasonable requirements with respect
to streets, alleys, public grounds, or other public improvements. Id. The plan may be
made applicable by its terms to land situated within the corporate limits and contiguous territory not more than 1-1/2 miles beyond the corporate limits and not included
in any municipality. Id.
31. In Florida, for example, impact fees have long been judicially sustained even
absent specific enabling legislation. See, e.g., Contractors & Builders Ass'n of Pinellas
County v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867
(1979). See also infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
pattern.
32. The villages of Elk Grove, Bollingbrook and Roselle, Illinois, are among the
municipalities that charge per acre annexation fees. Other municipalities in DuPage
County collect fees through subdivision ordinances. See DuPage County Impact Fee

Study, supra note 12.
33. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (1970). See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying
text for a discussion of home rule authority.
34. City of Carbondale v. Van Natta, 61 111. 2d 483, 485-86, 338 N.E.2d 19, 21
(1975).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 21:489

municipalities possess the same-not more-powers to impose extraterritorial land use regulations as non-home rule municipalities."8
Consequently, all municipalities must look to the statutes as the
source of power to exercise extraterritorial control over land use.
The Illinois Municipal Code authorizes a municipality to develop and adopt a comprehensive plan for its present and future development, and to implement the plan by ordinances.3 6 The plan
may be made applicable to both the territory within the municipality's corporate limits and contiguous territory within one and onehalf miles of its corporate limits.8 7 The implementation ordinances
may: (1) establish subdivision design standards; (2) establish requirements regarding public infrastructure such as for streets,
schools and parks; and (3) recommend zoning classifications for land
designated as suitable for annexation to the municipality.38 These
extraterritorial powers are not limited to the actual division of land.
In City of Urbana v. County of Champaign,9 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that because of the "developmental impact" on public
facilities of a proposed planned unit development within the City's
one and one-half mile jurisdiction, the development was within the
contemplation of the statute granting subdivision authority beyond
the corporate boundaries.4
35. See, e.g., Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 41 Ill. App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489,
495 (1976).
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 11-12-5 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
37. Id.
38. Id. 11-12-5(1). On its face, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, T 11-12-5 is not limited to
subdivisions; municipalities also have the power to adopt regulations regarding
streets that are not within subdivisions. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,
11-12-5 to 12-8
have been interpreted to authorize municipal subdivision exactions both within the
corporate limits and in the 1-1/2 miles zone. Id.
39. 76 Ill. 2d 63, 389 N.E.2d 1185 (1979).
40. Id. at 67, 389 N.E.2d at 1188. In City of Urbana, the Court stated:
In our judgment the touchstone of a city's power to impose subdivision controls is not the division of a tract into two or more parcels but its developmental impact upon existing facilities protecting the health and safety of the municipal residents. We conclude therefore that the present development is a
subdivision within the statutory meaning.
Id. In this case, however, the Urbana ordinance defined "subdivision" as the division
of land so that the developer was not required to comply with the standards of the
subdivision ordinance because the planned development did not involve the division
of land. See Village of Lake Bluff v. Jacobson, 118 Ill. App. 3d 102, 454 N.E.2d 734
(1983). In Lake Bluff, the Village had amended its definition of "subdivision" to correct the error of City of Urbana. The court held that the subdivision power extended
to planned developments within the one and one-half mile zone even though no division of land was involved. The court noted:
The most reasonable reading of the statute, and the one most consistent with
Urbana, seems to be that the statute gives municipalities the right to exercise
their police power over extraterritorial developments in the same way that they
exercise that power over developments within their territory, in recognition
that a municipality's concerns do not end at its borders.
Id. at 110, 454 N.E.2d at 739.
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The ordinance challenged in KrughofJ v. City of Naperville,4
which the Illinois Supreme Court upheld, required that both subdivisions and planned unit developments either inside the corporate
limits or within the one and one-half mile zone make contributions
of land or money in lieu of land. These contributions were to be
used for school or park sites. The exactions involved were not called
"impact fees," but the court's analysis of the Municipal Code and
relevant case law leads to the conclusion that a provision which requires construction of roads or the payment of a fee for roads would
be upheld.
4.

Amendment to Illinois Highway Code

The Illinois legislature recently amended the Illinois Highway
Code to allow a county board of any county with a population between 400,000 and 1,000,000 people to create transportation impact
districts, to collect transportation impact fees, and to adopt reasonable regulations necessary to administer and enforce a fee program.4 2
41. 41 111. App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489 (1976), aff'd, 68 Ill. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d
892 (1977).
42. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121, 5-608 (amended Sept. 17, 1987, enacted as P.A. 85464, effective Jan. 1, 1988). The legislature apparently intended to afford county
boards the greatest possible flexibility in implementing impact fees. There was no
floor debate in either the House or the Senate, and the bill was unanimously approved. According to the House Republican Staff Analysis, the reason for the amendment is to provide additional revenues to Lake and DuPage counties so that they may
maintain their road systems "at a level adequate to handle the traffic created by new
development." J. CRoss, HOUSE REPUBLICAN STAFF ANALYSIS (April 21, 1987). The law
prior to this new amendment provided that the counties could levy their own special
road taxes and expend their allotted Motor Fuel Tax funds for these same purposes.
No such organization or program, however, was ever put into effect. Id.
Because the amendment to the Highway Code is specifically applicable to county
boards of only those counties with a population between 400 thousand and I million
people, one of the challenges to the law may be that the population classification
renders it "special legislation." The Illinois Constitution prohibits special legislation
and states that "the General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination." ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13. A review
of the case law, however, reveals that Illinois courts would not look favorably upon
such a challenge to the new amendment since they have held that in the enactment of
general laws, the legislature may classify counties and municipalities on the basis of
population. See Alexander v. City of Chicago, 14 11. 2d 261, 151 N.E.2d 319 (1958)
(upheld a statute providing for transfer of property and personnel between cities and
park districts that contained a population classification which made the statute applicable only to the City of Chicago); see also People v. Clark, 71 111. App. 3d 381, 389
N.E.2d 911 (1979) (upheld County Treasurer's Act that applied criminal sanctions
only to proscribed conduct in counties exceeding populations of 150,000 persons); DuBois v. Gibbons, 2 Ill. 2d 392, 118 N.E.2d 295 (1954) (upheld a statute that conferred
investigatory and subpoena powers relative to law enforcement upon cities of over
500,000 population, although applicable only to the City of Chicago). In In Re Belmont Fire Protection Dist., 111 Ill. 2d 373, 489 N.E.2d 1385 (1986), however, the
court invalidated a fire protection district transfer statute that applied to counties
having a population between 600 thousand and 1 million as special legislation. Id. at
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Under the new amendment, persons who construct new developments that have either direct or indirect access to the county or
state highway systems would be subject to an impact fee when the
county board uses the enabling legislation.'
The Highway Code amendment provides that the impact fee is
calculated based on both the amount of estimated traffic that the
new development generates and the types of improvements needed
to maintain a reasonable level of service on the existing and proposed highway system. 4 ' The amendment specifies that counties
earmark all fees collected under such an ordinance in special funds
established for each transportation district, and spend monies for
improvements within, or in areas immediately
adjacent to, the dis45
trict from which the fees were collected.

The amendment to the Illinois Highway Code is ground breaking in that it explicitly paves the way for transportation impact fee
programs in DuPage and Lake counties, the two counties in Illinois
that qualify under the legislation. The amendment is equally important, however, in that it reflects the state legislature's strong interest
in fostering fair share fee programs as a means of accommodating
new growth and development. The amendment establishes population categories that should not be interpreted to preclude those
counties and municipalities that fall outside their ambit from imposing similar impact fees. Throughout the country, municipalities have
implemented legally sustainable impact fee programs without specific enabling legislation. While an amendment of this sort may bolster the authority of those counties to which it applies, it should by
no means preclude other Illinois counties and municipalities that
could benefit from a ride on the impact fee bandwagon from imposing their own impact fees.
385-86, 489 N.E.2d at 1391. The court determined that there was no reasonable basis
for the population classification since there was no reason why municipalities with
similar needs in similar counties (with populations outside the classification) should
not be allowed to consolidate fire protection services into a single fire protection district. The court explained that the classification was not based on the level of urbanization or the density of a county's population, and was therefore arbitrary and unreasonable. Id. at 384-85, 489 N.E.2d at 1388-89.
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, 5-608 (1987) (amended Sept. 17, 1987, enacted as
P.A. 85-464, effective Jan. 1, 1988).
44. Id.
45. The amendment is generally worded, but seems to anticipate the type of fee
program that has been legally sustained in other states. In order to ensure that an
impact fee will withstand legal challenges, it should be based on tight methodology
that satisfies a needs-based standard, should contain administrative safeguards (including earmarking, time limits, refunds, and benefit districts), and should compute
offsets and credits. See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of
administrative issues.

19881

Impact Fees

B.
1.

Standards for Reviewing an Impact Fee Program

"Specifically and Uniquely Attributable"

Exactions and development fees are not new concepts in Illinois. Indeed, for decades Illinois municipalities have tried to shift
the cost of providing services to new growth and development to the
developer and the new residents who create the costs. Nonetheless,
Illinois has gained the reputation of being tough on exactions." Unlike other states that have openly embraced the advent of impact
fees as a means of funding off-site capital facilities, Illinois has traditionally been more conservative.
In order for a mandatory dedication to be a valid exercise of the
police power, Illinois municipalities historically faced the difficult
burden of proving that the need for the capital improvement was
"specifically and uniquely" attributable to the development of the
particular subdivision.4 7 The landmark case of Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect' laid out the judicial criteria for assessing the constitutionality of developer exactions in Illinois.49 In Pioneer Trust, a developer challenged the validity of an
ordinance that required dedication of public grounds as a condition
of plat approval.6 0 The Illinois Supreme Court noted that while a
municipality may require a developer to provide the streets that a
subdivision requires, it cannot require the developer to provide a
major thoroughfare-the need for which stems from the total activity of the community. 51 The court in Pioneer Trust determined that
the mandatory dedication of land for educational purposes was unrelated to the developer's subdivision plat.2 The court further explained that in Illinois an exaction will be held constitutional when
it is within a municipality's statutory grant of power and is "specifically and uniquely attributable" to a developer's activity. 3
46. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of exactions in
Illinois.
47. See generally Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,
22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961) (holding that municipality may require developer to dedicate some land to public use provided that use is specifically attributable
to the development).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 375, 176 N.E.2d at 799.
51. Id. at 380, 176 N.E.2d at 801-02.
52. Id. at 380, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
53. The Illinois Supreme Court characterized the test for exactions in Illinois:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to the municipality
and if the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity, then the requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to a confiscation of private property in contravention of the
constitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable regulation under the police
power.
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By 1968, the Illinois Supreme Court considered it "unquestioned" in People ex rel. Exchange National Bank of Chicago v.
City of Lake Forest,4 that an appropriately authorized municipality
could require compliance with reasonable regulatory conditions
before approving and recording plats for the subdivision of land. 5
As in Pioneer Trust, however, the court in Exchange National Bank
could not find that the need for the new public streets was "specifically and uniquely attributable" to any activity that would arise
from the plaintiff's resubdivision of twenty-five acres into two lots."
The court held that the City's refusal to approve the plaintiff's plat
of resubdivision because the plaintiff did not agree to dedicate land
for new public roadways "exceeded the bounds of permissible and
reasonable regulations," and would have constituted a taking of private property for public use without just compensation." According
to the court, if the City needed to acquire the land, it would have to
do so by other means, such as through purchase or condemnation."
Just nine years later, however, in Krughoff v. City of NaperviUle," the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a regulation requiring
dedication of land, or contribution of fees in lieu, for school and
park purposes.8 " The city's ordinance required developers to make
contributions of land or money in lieu of land as a condition of plat
approval for a subdivision or planned unit development inside the
corporate limits, or within its extraterritorial jurisdiction." The
money or land would be used for schools and park sites.2 The court
Id. at 380, 176 N.E.2d at 802 (emphasis added).
54. 40 Ill. 2d 281, 239 N.E.2d 819, 821 (1968).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 287, 239 N.E.2d at 822.
57. Id. at 288, 239 N.E.2d at 823.
58. Id.
59. 41 111. App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489 (1976), aff'd, 68 Ill. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d
892 (1977).
60. Id. For earlier Illinois exaction cases that developed this standard, see
Board of Educ. of School Dist. No. 68, DuPage County v. Surety Developers, Inc., 63
Ill. 2d 193, 347 N.E.2d 149 (1975); Duggan v. County of Cook, 60 Il1. 2d 107, 324
N.E.2d 406 (1975); Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230
(1960); Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Il. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956). Many
courts that have adopted the "specifically and uniquely attributable standard" have
also applied an equally restrictive "direct benefit" test, by which the funds collected
from mandatory dedications had to be specifically tied to a benefit conferred on
homeowners within the subdivision. See, e.g., Gulest Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1962). In
Gulest, developers challenged an ordinance that charged in lieu fees for "neighborhood park, playground or recreational purposes including the acquisition of property." Id. at 732. The court held that the ordinance amounted to an unconstitutional
taking since the money the town collected would not be used for the direct benefit of
the homeowners of the subdivision charged. Rather, the funds could be used in any
section of town for any residential purposes. Id. at 732-33.
61. Krughoff, 41 Ill. App. 3d at 354, 369 N.E.2d at 893.
62. Id.
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held that the City had the power to require such dedication of land,
or money in lieu of land because the evidence showed that the required contributions were "uniquely attributable to" and fairly proportionate with the need for new school and park facilities, which
the proposed development created."
Although the Illinois courts have yet to categorically denounce
the "uniquely and specifically attributable" test, and because impact
fee ordinances for facilities other than schools and parks are still
relatively new to Illinois, it is too early to determine whether the
Illinois courts will continue to utilize this highly restrictive standard
if an impact fee ordinance is challenged on constitutional grounds.
There are indications, however, that Illinois courts are leaning towards a more liberal interpretation of the validity of exaction
ordinances. 4
Indeed, in light of recent United States Supreme Court land use
decisions, it is likely that Illinois courts may turn away from the
thirty-year-old "specifically and uniquely attributable" standard
and embrace the more modern "rational nexus" test discussed
below.65
2.

"Reasonable Relationship" Standard

Courts have liberally applied the due process "reasonableness"
requirement for exercises of police power in other states construing
impact fee ordinances under the "reasonable relationship" or "fairly
debatable" standard. Under this test, every reasonable presumption is indulged in favor of the constitutionality of the exaction, and
if the ordinance bears any reasonable relation to the public welfare
63. Id. at 359, 369 N.E.2d at 895.
64. See, e.g., Plote, Inc. v. Minnesota Alden Co., 96 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 422
N.E.2d 231, 235 (1981). The appellate court noted in dicta that "[tihere has been a
general movement by our supreme court away from an earlier position holding such
conditions invalid. The more recent cases adopt a liberal construction of the right of a
municipality to impose conditions in return for a grant of a variation or approval of a
plat." In Plote, a developer was estopped from challenging the validity of the municipal ordinance that conditioned the issuance of a special use permit on his promise to
contribute a "per unit" sum to the Village of Schaumburg cultural center. Id. at 1002,
422 N.E.2d at 236. Because the developer failed to show that his promise resulted
from duress, the court never reached the issue of whether the dedication exaction was
valid. Id.
65. See infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rational
nexus standard.
66. See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council of City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207
P.2d 1 (1949) (upheld dedication requirement pertaining to off-state widening of
roads); Lampton v. Pinaire, 610 S.W.2d. 915, 919 (Ky. App. 1980) (upheld subdivision
regulations that required dedication of land for additional right-of-way as a condition
precedent to plat approval); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218
N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966) (upheld dedication requirement, or payment of
fee in lieu, for park and recreational purposes).
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and morals the courts may not declare it invalid."7 According to the
reasonable relationship test, if the constitutionality of an ordinance
is "fairly debatable," courts cannot substitute their judgment for
that of the legislative authority.
The constitutional standard that a court will apply for an impact fee ordinance, however, is likely to be more restrictive than the
"reasonable relationship" test. Although there is no direct holding to
this effect, the United States Supreme Court in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 8 strongly suggests that a heightened level of
judicial scrutiny is appropriate for development exactions and that
mandatory permitting regulations must bear at least a rational relationship to the public interest.6
61. See, e.g., Ayres, 34 Cal. 2d at 40, 207 P.2d at 11-12; Lampton, 610 S.W.2d at
919; Jenad, 18 N.Y.2d at 82, 218 N.E.2d at 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 958-59.
68. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
69. Nollan, the United States Supreme Court's most recent takings issue case,
may have resulted in the blending of the distinctions between the three standards
used to test the constitutionality of development exactions. In Nollan, a divided Supreme Court invalidated a beach access condition imposed on a building permit
granted by the California Coastal Commission to homeowners who sought to replace
a dilapidated bungalow with a large new home on their beachfront lot. Nollan, 107 S.
Ct. 3143. The condition required the Nollans to convey an easement that would allow
the public lateral access to the shorefront. Id. The Commission alleged that the purposes of the condition were to reduce any obstacles to viewing the beach created by
the new house, to lower any "psychological barriers" to using the beach, and to remedy congestion along the beach. Id. at 3148-49.
The majority of the Court found that the condition was not sufficiently related to
the public purposes set forth by the Commission, and that the condition therefore
violated the takings clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 3150. The Court believed
the Commission's reasons for requiring dedication of the easement were a "legitimate
state interest," but nonetheless held that the condition itself did not sufficiently advance those purposes. Id. at 3148. The Court suggested that a heightened standard of
review should apply to land use regulations that involve the actual conveyance of
property, and that go further than merely restricting specific uses. Id. at 3147 n.3,
3148. The Court stated:
As indicated earlier, our cases describe the condition for abridgment of property rights through the police power as a "substantial advance[ing]" of a legitimate State interest. We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting
of a land use restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the
purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirements, rather than the stated
police power objective.
Id. at 3150.
Although the Nollan Court did not expressly endorse the "rational nexus" standard, its analysis is nonetheless consistent with state courts' use of this standard in
subdivision dedication cases. See, e.g., Town of Longboat Keys v. Lands End, Ltd.,
433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. App. 1983) (proper nexus must exist between the stated purposes
of an ordinance and the amount of money or land to be set aside by developers for
parks and open space purposes); Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22
Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961) (held a subdivider was not required to dedicate
land for educational and recreational facilities because they were unrelated to his
subdivision plat); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955 (upheld the constitutionality of village regulations which authorized the
planning commission to require subdividers to pay a fee or allot some land as a condition precedent to the approval of a subdivision plat); and Jordan v. Village of Me-
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3. "Rational Nexus" Standard
The "rational nexus" constitutional standard of reasonableness
for fees in lieu of dedication for off-site improvements was introduced in Wisconsin in 1966. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,7 0 held that fees in lieu of dedi-

cation for off-site educational and recreational purposes were a valid
exercise of the police power if there was a "reasonable connection
between the need for additional facilities and the growth generated
by the subdivision. ' 71 Funds earmarked for certain capital improvements were also required to "substantially benefit" the development
that paid the fee.7 2 Whether the general public would incidentally
benefit from the planned capital facilities is not a factor that would
affect the reasonableness of the fee requirement.'
The principles set forth in Jordan are now applied in many
states, and have been broken down into a three part standard: (1)
new development must create a demand for a new capital facility;
(2) a "rational nexus" must exist between this new development and
the need for these new facilities; and (3) there must be some assurance that sufficient benefit accrues to the particular development
that pays the fee.74 Once these "rational nexi" are established, a
nomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965) (compulsory land dedication
requirement is a constitutional exercise of the police power, so long as it is practicable
for school, park, and recreation sites, and bears a reasonable connection to the municipality's increased need to accommodate the new development), appeal dismissed,
385 U.S. 4 (1966). The Supreme Court in Nollan determined that there must be some
"fit" between the beach access condition imposed on the Nollans and the burden that
their new house creates or to which it contributes. No~lan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150. The
Court did not find it necessary, however, to discuss how close a "fit" is required since
"the Justices found that this case does not even meet the most untailored standards."
Id.
The practical lesson of Nollan is that local governments must be particularly
careful when they impose land use regulations that require the actual conveyance of
private property for public use without just compensation. Although the Supreme
Court has not yet elaborated on how strong the nexus between the development condition and the public purpose must be to sustain an exaction, it seems likely that the
regulations must bear at least a "rational" relationship to the public's interest. See
also Siemon & Larsen, Exactions and Takings After Nollan, LAND UsE LAW & ZON.
DIG., Sept. 1987, at 3.
70. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
71. Id. at 614, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
72. Id.
73. Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer To Local Governments'
CapitalFunding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415, 432-33 n.99 (1981). The authors
add that as long as the fee requirements are reasonably related to the needs that the
subdivision creates, the benefits to development need not be distinguishable from the
benefits to the general public. Id.
74. See, e.g., Associated Homebuilders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, (1971); Home Builders
Ass'n of Greater K.C. v. City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1977); Call v. City
of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979). These cases follow the standard established in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442
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payment requirement authorized by the local government has the
same presumption of validity under the police power as other zoning
and land use regulations, and the developer has the burden of disproving its reasonableness." In Florida, where impact fees are an
accepted "fact of life" for new development, such ordinances have
survived legal challenges for over a decade, even though there is no
specific enabling legislation that grants such authority to local municipalities. For this reason, local governments in other states look
to Florida impact fees. The landmark decision in Florida, upholding
the concept of impact fees, is Contractors and Builders Association
of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin.76 In reaching its judgment
upholding impact fees for water and sewers, the Florida Supreme
Court established the principles that have become the hallmarks of
other impact fee cases involving roads and other public facilities.7
(1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
75. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 73, at 433. The two-pronged "rational
nexus" test, therefore, provides a framework for analyzing the constitutional validity
of impact fee payments under the police power. Id.
76. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979). In Dunedin,
the City of Dunedin enacted an ordinance that imposed an impact fee of $325 for
each residential water connection and $375 for each residential sewer connection to
pay for costs the city would incur for the expansion of capital facilities to provide
water and sewer services. Id. at 316-17 n.1. The Home Builders Association in Pinellas County brought an action for declaratory judgment against the city, claiming the
ordinance was an ultra vires attempt by the city to tax and an unconstitutional discrimination against "newcomers." Id. at 316-17.
77. Due to unfavorable case law prior to the court's decision in Dunedin, many
people in Florida argued that the effect of the court's decision was limited to water
and sewers. In 1983, two cases from the Florida appellate courts put to rest any further argument on this point. The first decision, Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County,
431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), reviewed a Broward County ordinance that
required a subdivider, as a condition of plat approval, to dedicate land or pay a fee to
be used to expand a county-wide park system so that new park facilities could accommodate the new residents of the platted development. Id. The court determined that
the ordinance would meet federal and state constitutional challenges so long as the
funds offset needs sufficiently attributable to the subdivision and were specifically
earmarked for the substantial benefit of the subdivision residents. Id. at 611. The
court applied a "rational nexus" test to determine whether a fee benefit correlation
existed, and held that the government must show a "reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the expenditures of the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision." Id. at 611-12 (emphasis added).
In the second case, Home Builders and Contractors Ass'n of Palm Beach County,
Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983), the local Home Builders Association challenged Palm Beach County's
"Fair Share Contribution For Road Improvements" ordinance. Id. at 141. The
County Commission enacted the ordinance because an unusual growth rate was being
experienced in the county and because extensive road improvements would be necessary in order to maintain a consistent level of road service and quality of life. Id. The
ordinance was intended to finance the necessary capital road improvements and to
regulate increases in traffic levels. Id. Any new land development activity that generated road traffic would be required to pay its "fair share" of the reasonably anticipated cost of expansion of new roads that was sufficiently attributable to the new
development. Id.
The court determined that the ordinance was valid even though the benefits ac-
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In Florida, it now appears clear that an impact fee would be sustained if the following tests are met:
(1)

new development requires additional capacity for a particular
public facility;
(2) the fees imposed do not exceed a pro rata share of the reasonably anticipated costs of capital expansion and are exacted only to
accommodate new development; and
(3) the funds are specifically earmarked and delineated so that there
is a reasonable connection between the expenditure of funds collected and the benefits accruing to the development. 8

III.

ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES:

How

AND WHEN TO COLLECT AND

SPEND THE FEE

Illinois municipalities that decide to implement an impact fee
program will have to consider a host of administrative issues to ensure that their fee will be legally defensible if challenged in court.
While impact fee programs may be new to these municipalities, they
can fortunately take advantage of both the wisdom and mistakes of
local governments elsewhere that have survived the first generation
of such fees. 79 The backbone of an impact fee ordinance is not just
the population or trip generation data used to compute the fee
schedule. Rather, a defensible ordinance must accommodate due
process, equal protection, and other equity limitations."0
cruing from roads constructed with the impact fees did not inure exclusively or overwhelmingly to those who paid for them. Id. at 143. The court adopted the principle
established in other state courts, including Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34
Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); and Call, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979), and held that the
"benefit accruing to the community generally does not adversely affect the validity of
a development regulation ordinance as long as the fee does not exceed the cost of
improvements required by the new development and the improvements adequately
benefit the development which is the source of the fee." Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n of Palm Beach County Inc., 446 So. 2d at 143-44. The court noted that the
ordinance would only generate 20% of the cost of providing the facilities, and that
the formula was not rigid since it allowed an independent calculation to be made. Id.
If the independent calculations showed that the new use would have a less impact on
roads than anticipated, the fee would be reduced. Id.
78. Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 321. In Dunedin, the court dismissed an equal protection claim and noted that the ordinance at issue did not unconstitutionally discriminate against "newcomers" in that the "fees are payable by every person who
hereafter connects into the city's water or sewer system, even if he has lived in the
city all of his life and his property is in the heart of the city." City of Dunedin v.
Contractors and Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County, 312 So. 2d 763, 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975), rev'd, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
79. As local governments have become more familiar with impact fees, and as
impact fees have gone through several rounds of court battles, the "second generation" of impact fees is currently emerging. This second generation of fees considers
more sophisticated traffic engineering methodology and more closely ties the relationship of the impact of new development to the fee payor.
80. See supra note 17 and accompanying text for a discussion of constitutional
limitations.
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Under the rational nexus standard for assessing the constitutional validity of an impact fee ordinance, a fee program will pass
legal muster if: (1) new development creates a demand for new capital facilities; (2) a nexus exists between this new development and
the need for these new facilities; and (3) sufficient benefit accrues to
the fee payor.9' Impact fee ordinances reflect this standard by setting up fairly rigid administrative procedures. The typical impact
fee ordinance allows for fee agreements, individual assessment of
impact, refunds, and credits and exemptions to ensure that no developer is assessed more than his or her "fair share" of the cost of
capital facilities, which the fee targets.
Individual assessment of development impact allows any developer to challenge the impact fee schedule by providing an individual
impact assessment.8 2 Individual assessments are usually used to determine whether a fair share of the capital expansion costs, which
the proposed development necessitates, should be less than the fee
established in the ordinance's schedule. In addition, any person who
initiates development may be able to apply for a credit against the
impact fee for any contribution, payment, construction or dedication
of land that the municipality accepts and receives for the targeted
capital facilities improvements. The credit would be equal to the
dollar value of the cost of off-site improvements the developer (or
his or her predecessor in interest) previously contributed, paid for,
or committed to in conjunction with any development permit the
municipality issues.
Additionally, an impact fee ordinance usually provides that the
municipality earmark and segregate the fee into trust accounts that
81. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rational nexus standard of determining the constitutional validity of impact fees; see
also Associated Homebuilders of Greater East Bay, Inc., v. City of Walnut Creek, 4
Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878
(1971); Kansas City v. City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1977); Call, 606 P.2d
217 (Utah 1979) (examples of practical applications of the rational nexus test). Because impact fees may not be used to finance existing deficiencies, in order for a
municipality that decides to implement an impact fee program to establish the requisite nexus, it will have to show that the development condition substantially advances
a legitimate public purpose. The municipality will have to precisely document the
costs to the public that are generated by the new development, and the manner in
which a mandatory dedication requirement or an impact fee would alleviate those
costs. If the exactions do not relate to the stated purpose, the development condition
will not pass the rational nexus test.
82. The proposed interim road impact fee ordinance for the City of Peoria, Illi-

nois, for example, provides for individual assessment of road impacts as follows:
Any person who initiates any development may choose to provide an individual assessment of the road impacts of the proposed development. The individual assessment may be used to determine whether a fair share of the capital
expansion costs necessitated by the proposed development should be less than
the fee established in [the fee schedule] . . ..
PEORIA, ILL., PROPOSED INTERIM FAIR SHARE ROAD IMPACT FEE ORDINANCE § 11 (1988).
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are kept separate from the other funds of the municipality."' Proceeds from the trust accounts are used exclusively for capital expansion of the facilities in the impact district from which they were collected. 4 Furthermore, as an additional assurance that the
development only pay its "fair share" of the cost of capital facilities
construction or expansion, most ordinances allow for the refund of
the monies collected if the fees have not been spent on targeted capital improvements within a specified time frame or if the approved
development is cancelled before construction has commenced.88
Some ordinances also exempt certain new development from
payment of its fair share of the impact fee." These exempted developments often include government buildings and affordable housing
thus encouraging certain housing development that ensures both the
long-term integrity of an area, and accommodating regional growth
influences.8 7 Other ordinances exempt developments when alteration
or expansion of an existing dwelling unit does not anticipate the creation of additional units and the use has not changed, when a destroyed or partially destroyed building is replaced by a new building
83. Dunedin, 312 So. 2d at 763.
84. Impact fee ordinances often provide for the establishment of "impact districts" to ensure that the fees collected are expended for the benefit of the geographical area from which they were collected. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121, 1 5-608
(amended Sept. 17, 1987, enacted as P.A. 85-464, effective Jan. 1, 1988), the new
amendment to the Illinois Highway Code, which provides that the county boards may
establish transportation impact districts. Id. The design of such districts do not have
to be narrowly drawn. Especially with large development, roads which are some distance from a particular development may be affected; therefore, fees collected may be
used to construct additional improvements. Funds collected pursuant to a transportation impact fee ordinance can be used for the purpose of acquisition, expansion and
development of the roads, streets, highways, and bridges necessary to serve a new
development. A likely expenditure of funds collected pursuant to a transportation
impact fee ordinance would include: design and construction plan preparation; rightof-way acquisition; construction of new through lanes; construction of new turn lanes;
construction of new bridges; construction of new drainage facilities in conjunction
with new roadway construction; purchase and installation of traffic signalization; construction of new curbs; medians and shoulders; and landscaping of medians and
sidewalks.
85. See, e.g., Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n of Palm Beach County, Inc. v.
Board of County Comm'rs of Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983), which implicitly approves the administrative procedures for the refund of impact fees.
86. The United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court have held
that a government may differentiate between persons similarly situated as long as the
classification bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. See,
e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563,
376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978).
87. For example, in Monroe County, Florida, developers are exempt from paying impact fees if they construct affordable housing units. MONROE COUNTY, FLA.,
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN LAND DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS,

vol. III, ch. 12,

§ 101-05

(1986). Public governmental buildings are also exempt. Id. Other exemptions have
also been provided for single family dwelling units in the Pinelands, New Jersey,
when municipal ordinances would otherwise have interfered with a community's development objectives. N.J. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 7.50, § 5.22 (1982).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 21:489

or structure of the same size and use, or when development is proposed for a downtown redevelopment area.88 Exemption regulations
imply a municipality's willingness to decrease the amount of funds
collected on behalf of the capital facility in order to provide adequate housing stock or building space for the targeted group. The
impact of exemption policies must be clearly articulated so that the
purpose of the compromise is clearly understood.8 9 Also, it is important to calculate exemptions with caution to ensure that the deficit
exemptions created will not be absorbed by other developers who
remain subject to the fee.
IV. CONCLUSION
The adoption of the recent amendment to the Illinois Highway
Code presently authorizing two counties to adopt impact fee programs to assist in the financing of the county and state road system
symbolizes a state-level recognition of the need for managed growth.
The General Assembly now recognizes that impact fees can fund the
improvement and expansion of capital facilities and that impact fees
are a viable and equitable means of generating revenues to ensure
that those facilities will adequately serve new growth and development. This recognition brings Illinois officially into the national
mainstream. Many municipalities in the state are either in the process of developing or have already developed similar programs for
roads and other facilities, and it is to be expected that more will
follow. Home rule municipalities clearly have the authority to adopt
impact fee programs, and a strong argument can be made that nonhome rule municipalities possess the same authority.
The question left open for the moment is which standard the
Illinois courts will use to measure the constitutionality of this next
generation of such regulatory fee programs. In recent years, the Illinois courts have indicated that they may be relaxing the "uniquely
and specifically attributable" standard that has been routinely cited
as the "Illinois test." 90 The United States Supreme Court decision in
Nollan v. California.Coastal Commission 1 is being heralded as establishing a new expression of the constitutional standard for exactions, and it is likely that Illinois will turn to this characterization of
88. See, e.g., MONROE COUNTY, FLA. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN LAND DEVELOPMENT
REGULATION, Vol. III, ch. 12, § 105(H)(1986); PEORIA, ILL., PROPOSED INTERIM FAIR
SHARE ROAD IMPACT FEE ORDINANCE § 11 (1988).
89. See Siemon, supra note 17, at 126, for a discussion of the impact of exaction
schemes on the cost of housing and the potential for discrimination against the poor.

Id.
90.

See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "spe-

cifically and uniquely attributable" test.

91. 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987).
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the standard if a challenge is presented. The elements the courts
will look for are straightforward. A municipality, county, or other
unit of government that decides to implement an impact fee program will have to demonstrate the burden the new development imposes, and also establish procedures to ensure that the new development is paying no more than its "fair share" of the cost of
improvements. Properly designed and managed, impact fees have
their place . . . even in Illinois.

